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POVERTY ALLEVIATION POLICIES IN INDIA: FOOD CONSUMPTION SUBSIDY,
FOOD PRODUCTION SUBSIDY AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION

Abstract

Poverty alleviation has been the overarching objective of the development
strategy of India since independence, although achievements have fallen far
short of expectations.

Over time a number of targeted and non-targeted

poverty alleviation policies of varying extent of coverage and efficiency have
been tried.

The paper compares the effectiveness of some of these policy

interventions in alleviating poverty using counter-factual policy simulations
with a sequential applied general equilibrium model of the Indian economy for
the period 1980-2000.
(i)

Specifically the simulated policies include

abolishing the existing subsidized public distribution of a specified

amount of foodgrains to all urban residents or alternatively extending it to
the rural areas and making it completely free,
(ii)

the introduction of a rural works programs (RWP) targeted at the

poorest groups of varying efficiency in its design and execution as well as
its success in targeting,
(iii)

abolition of the existing fertiliser subsidy and the use of part of

the resources saved for augmenting aggregate investment and the remaining
spent either on a rural works programme or on creating additional irrigated
area.
The results suggest that a well designed, executed and targeted RWP has
the greatest impact in alleviating poverty.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION POLICIES IN INDIA: FOOD CONSUMPTION SUBSIDY,
FOOD PRODUCTION SUBSIDY AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION

1.

Introduction
The Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined in the Indian

constitution (Basu (1983)) enjoin the state to strive to secure "a social
order in which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the
institutions of national life" and "to minimize inequality in income, status,
facilities and opportunities, amongst individuals and groups" (Article 38),
and to ensure "that the ownership and control of the material resources of the
community are so distributed as best to subscribe the common good; that the
operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of
wealth and means of production to the common detriment" (Article 39).

Article

41 seeks to make effective provision for securing the right to work, to educa
tion and public assistance in cases of unemployment, disability, sickness etc.
The strong egalitarian and redistributive thrust of these principles is
evident.

The government resolution establishing in Planning Commission in

1950 explicitly invoked these principles and the very first Five Year Plan set
out the task of development as to "translate

the goals of social and

economic policy prescribed in the Directive Principles of the Constitution
into a national programme based upon the assessment of needs and resources"
(as quoted in Draft Sixth Five Year Plan 1979-83).
It should also be stressed that from the early days of planning concerns
were expressed that benefits of growth may not be equitably shared.

We can do
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no better than to quote from a speech given by Prime Minister Nehru in the
Parliament in 1960 while introducing the Third Five Year Plan:
" ... it is said that the national income over the
First and Second Plans has gone up by 42 per cent and
the per capita income by 20 per cent. A legitimate
query is made where has this gone? It is a very
legitimate query; to some extent of course, you can
see where it has gone. I sometimes do address large
gatherings in the villages and I can see that they
are better-fed and better-clothed, they build brick
houses ..... Nevertheless, this does not apply to
everybody in India. Some people probably have hardly
benefited. Some people may even be facing various
difficulties. The fact remains, however, that this
advance in our national income, in our per cpaita
income has taken place, and I think it is desirable
that we should enquire more deeply as to where this
has gone and appoint some expert committee to enquire
into how exactly this additional income that has come
to the country or per capita has spread."
The concern that the growth process may have been unequalizing led Nehru's
government to appoint a committee in 1960 under the Chairmanship of Professor
P. C. Mahalanobis to study the distribution of income and levels of living in
India.

Even before this committee submitted its report in 1964, Mr. ~itambar

Pant, then the head of the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning
Commission, prepared a paper in 1962 (Srinivasan and Bardhan (1974), ch. 1)
outlining a fifteen year perspective plan whose objective was to assure a
minimum level of living for the entire Indian population by 1976.

He argued

that "the central concern of our planning has to be the removal of poverty as
early as possible.

The stage has now come when we should sharply focus our

efforts on providing an assured minimum income to every citizen of the country
within a reasonable period of time.

Progressively the minimum itself should

be raised as development goes a pace."

This paper defined a minimum standard

of living i.e. a poverty line, which has formed the basis of all discussion
about poverty in India since then in the form of a minimum monthly per capita
household private consumption expenditure, while explicitly excluding
"expenditure on health and education, both of which are expected to be
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provided by the State."
Pant rejected massive redistribution as "operationally meaningless unless
revolutionary changes in property rights and scale and structure of wages and
compensation are contemplated."

He argued that rapid growth is vital for

poverty alleviation since "a comparison of distribution of incomes in
different countries ... at very different levels of development and with varying
socio-political environments ... follows a remarkably similar pattern,
especially in respect to the proportion of incomes earned by the lowest three
or four deciles of the population."

However he recognized that "on account of

certain peculiarities of the Indian economy, it is, however, uncertain whether
the distribution of income will remain stable with development or how it will
change."

Indeed, the paper specifically drew attention to the fact that in

the Indian economy, the poor living in remote areas and belonging to the vast
reserve of under-employed labour in rural areas (comprising landless labour,
cultivators with very small holdings, artisans with primitive techniques) with
limited mobility (across space and occupations) were loosely integrated with
the growing sectors of the economy and that economic development in itself was
unlikely to lift them out of their poverty.

For them income transfers were

seen as needed. Taking all these into consideration the paper arrived at a
growth target of 7% per annum by balancing what is desirable with what is
feasible by way of rate of growth and income redistribution within a given
period of time.
In the event, the perspective plan presented in Pant's paper was not
adopted.

Until Mrs. Gandhi raised elimination of poverty as the main plank of

her electoral platform in 1971, the planning commission did not formally
propose a poverty oriented component of five year plans. They did so with the
Fifth Five Year Plan for the period 1974-79.
The approach to the Fifth Plan postulated a specific objective of poverty
eradication along with the elimination of net external aid on concessional
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terms, neither of which has been attained to this day!

It included a "minimum

needs" component which was an updated version of the notion of minimum levels
of living of the Pant paper which itself anticipated the few worthwhile
elements of the late, but not so lamented, Basic Needs approach proclaimed by
some international agencies.

The Sixth Plan (1979-84) included a number of

poverty eradication measures such as programmes for rural works and
self-employment and schemes for increasing the productivity of small and
marginal farmers and rural artisans.

The urban poor had always been

beneficiaries of the public food distribution system under which a specified
quantum of food grains and a few other basic items of consumption were
supplied to all urban residents at a subsidized price.

This was a legacy of

the food rationing system introduced by the colonial government during the
war.

The supplies for the distribution system were obtained in part from

imports and in part from domestic procurement at prices which were, until a
few years ago, considerably below open market prices.

Besides the policy of

procurement and public distribution, various policies to encourage production
through the adoption of the cultivation of high yielding fertiliser responsive
varieties were introduced.

These were mainly in the form of subsidies on the

purchase of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, fuel and power as well as
water from public irrigation systems.

It was believed that such policies

alleviated poverty, on the one hand by improving the productivity and incomes
of small farmers, and inducing an outward shift in the demand for agricultural
labour, and on the other, by moderating any increase in the price of food
because of outward shifts in the demand for food due to increases in real
incomes.

Subsidized credit was made available for working capital as well as

for investment in irrigation (tubewells and energised dug wells) and farm
equipment.

We propose to compare the effectiveness of some of these policy

interventions in alleviating poverty.

Before describing the analytical

framework of an applied general equilibrium model used for this comparison,
some general considerations that led to that choice are worth describing.
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2.

The Rationale for and the Basic Features of an Applied General Equilibrium
Model
In a mixed economy such as India's in which market transactions are

dominant, the welfare of an individual depends on the quantities and prices of
the goods and factor services she sells (or buys) in the market as well as on
any income transfers she receives from others including the government.

In

particular, government fiscal policies (other than income transfer policies)
affect the welfare of all individuals including the poor through their direct
effects on the prices they face and the incomes they earn.

Of course, income

tarnsfer policies also affect prices indirectly through their effects on
demand.
It is self evident that in an economy with a fairly complex structure such
as India's, any economic policy is likely to affect market prices and hence
will have an impct on the welfare of the poor, although for many policies this
impact is likely to be negligible.

Of course policies that are explicitly

targeted at the poor, in principle, can be expected to have significant
effects.

It is unlikely that governments have a single well defined objective

such as poverty alleviation and choose a mutually consistent set of policies
towards achieving that objective.

It is much more likely that they have

several objectives and choose policies that promote some objectives further
than others, if not at their expense.

The combined effect of the mix of

policies, on the economy in general and the poor in particular is sometimes
difficult, if not impossible, to assess without an empirical model that
incorporates the important feed-back effects.
No real economy is likely to remain in a static or steady state
equilibrium.
important.

As such dynamic or inter-temporal effects of policies are
An oft discussed trade-off, mistakenly described by some as

between growth and equity, is in fact between more equity (or less poverty) in
the present and less equity (or more poverty) than otherwise in the future
through policies that finance present poverty alleviation through reductions
in

growth promoting investments.

For example, the resources used in
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subsidizing the food consumption of the poor, if invested in increasing the
quantum as well as productivity of assets owned by the poor, will obviously
hurt the welfare of the poor in the present while improving their incomes in
the future.

These considerations suggest that the analytical framework must

be capable of evaluating the combined effects of several policy interventions
on different socio-economic groups over time.

A natural framework satisfying

these desiderata is the dynamic applied general equilibrum model.
An applied general equilibrium model that is Walrasian in spirit assumes
that all agents recognized in the model behave rationally, i.e. each has a
consistent set of preferences over the outcomes of his or her actions and
chooses that action which has the most preferred outcome among all feasible
actions.

Typically, a consumer's preferences are assumed to be represented by

a utility function whose argument is the vector of his consumption of various
goods and services.

An action as well as its outcome is a particular choice

of the consumption vector.

And the feasible set of actions is simply those

within his budget, i.e. it is the set of all consumption vectors that cost no
more at the prices he faces (over which he is assumed to have no influence)
than the value of his endowment of commodities and factors and his share of
the net profits of firms.

In principle, the utility function and the budget

constraint can extend over several periods of time, thereby incorporating the
consumer's saving and portfolio choices.

Consumer choices, aggregated over

all consumers, yield the consumer demand for commodities, supplies of factor
services and demand for equities and debentures in firms.
a vector of outputs it produces and inputs it purchases.

A firm's action is
Feasible action

vectors are those that the technology available to the firm for transforming
inputs into outputs permits.

This set is the firm's production set.

Firms

are assumed to maximize net revenue, i.e. the difference between the value of
output and the cost of inputs at the prices they face over their production
sets.

Firm choices, aggregated over all firms, result in the supply of goods

and demand for factors.

Once again, by defining actions as extending over

several periods, investment activities can be accommodated, with the finance
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for investment arising from sale of equities and issue of debentures.

The

price vectors that ensure that markets for goods, factors and equities clear
is an equilibrium price vector.

Government is most naturally modeled in this

set up as an agent who sets commodity and factor taxes, tariffs, etc. makes
transfers and supplies some goods and services and demands others.

Its

expenditures are restricted to what it can finance through tax revenues and
borrowing from the public at home and abroad.

Although real world governments

also have the option of using the inflation tax mechanism of fiat money
creation for financing their expenditures, there is no theoretically
satisfactory way of introducing it in a 'real' model of the Walrasian genre.
Of course, the market clearance requirement will take into account government
demands and supplies as well.
It is clear that the task of empirically specifying such a model is
'demanding in terms of data, the need for specifying functional forms for
utility functions, production functions etc as well as requiring estimates of
the relevant parameters.

And it will inevitably involve making compromises

that are unsatisfactory from a theoretical perspective but dictated by the
available data and econometric knowledge.

Nevertheless, this framework or

something akin to it is absolutely essential if the various feed back effects
of several policies are to be analyzed consistently.

Above all it ensures

that there are no hidden sources for meeting excess demand or blackholes into
which excess supplies disappear, subsidies have to be financed, tax revenues
have to be spent etc.

For example, it will require that the introduction of,

say, a subsidy on the food consumption of the poor, is accompanied by a
specification of the mode of its financing so that both the direct impact of
the subsidy on the welfare of the poor and the indirect impact arising out of
the particular way in which it is financed are fully reflected in the
equilibrium.
Section 2 briefly describes the features of our applied general
equilibrium model of the Indian economy, its strengths and weaknesses.
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Section

3 is devoted to the specification of reference and policy scenarios

for simulation.

Section 4 presents the simulation results.

Section 5

concludes the paper drawing out the policy implications of the results.

3.

Features of the Applied General Equilibrium Model for India
The analytical model is of the sequential applied general equilibrium

(AGE) genre in which an equilibrium price vector is computed for each year in
succession.

Unlike other such models, a number of behavioural functions

relating to demand and supply have been econometrically estimated with data
mostly from the period 1950-51 to 1973-75.

In the running of the model, for

the period up to 1980, outputs, imports and exports were set equal to their
actual values, and the actually observed prices were generated as equilibrium
prices by ensuring market clearance at these prices through stock accumulation
or decumulation.

Indeed, the fact that such a procedure did not lead to

implausible values of changes in stocks was viewed as a validation of the
model.

The period after 1980 was the simulation period.

Great simplication

was achieved by imposing a one-year lag between production and market sale.
Thus, in effect the economy became an exchange economy for the purposes of
computing equilibrium prices.
The economy is divided into ten sectors, of which the first nine produce
agricultural commodities and the tenth produces the only non-agricultural
good.l

There are three sets of agents: producers, consumers, and government.

Consumers are classified by their residence as rural or urban.

Rural as well

as urban consumers are divided into five expenditure classes each according to
their monthly per capita household consumption expenditure.

Means of

production (capital), natural resources (land), human resources (labor), and
livestock (draft and milch animals; poultry, etc.) generate income through
production activities that is distributed to consumers.

Thus,

1 The nine agricultural commodities are rice, wheat, coarse grains, bovine
and ovine meats, dairy products, other animal products, protein feeds, other
food, and non-food agriculture.
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behaviour of producers (i.e., their production activities) determines
commodity supplies and incomes.

Consumer behaviour generates commodity

demands (and implicitly resource supplies).

The government sets policies

(e.g., investment targets, taxes, tariffs, quotas, rations, price supports and
ceilings, etc.). Finally, equilibrium is achieved through exchange in which
domestic demands, together with export demand by the rest of the world for
each sector's output, is equated to the sum of domestic supply (emerging from
previous year's production net of changes in stocks) and (foreign) import
supply.
Per capita consumer demand of each of ten classes of consumers for the
output of each sector is modeled as a Stone-Geary linear expenditure system.
The growth of total population and number of households (rural and urban) is
exogenously specified.

The joint distribution of households according to

their per capita income and consumption expenditure was assumed to be
log-normal in each period.

However the

mgfil}

logarithm of per capita income was allowed to
income.

of the marginal distribution of
over time with the growth of

Other parameters such as the variances, the correlation coefficient

and the intercept of the linear regression of logarithm of per capita
consumption on per capita income of the household were assumed to remain
constant at their estimated values from 1976 data.

This meant that the

mgfil}

of the conditional distribution of (the logarithm of) per capita household
consumption varied linearly with the mean of logarithm of per capita household
income.

Thus, the relevant population of households falling within each of

the ten expenditure classes as well as their mean per capita consumption
expenditure could be determined for each year given aggregate consumer income
for that year.

The difference between income and consumption expenditure

represents household savings.
Admittedly, the above distributional assumptions, including in particular
the assumption that only the means of the logarithm per capita household
income (and consumption) vary over time, are strong.

They imply that the
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concentratio n of the marginal distribution s of logarithms of income and
A more satisfactor y procedure would have been to

consumption do not change.

specify an initial distribution of factor endowments and derive the changes in
factor endowments from one period to the next as well as the savings in each
period from an intertempor al optimizatio n procedure, given appropraite
assumptions about expectation s regarding the path of factor prices including
returns on assets.

It goes without saying that implementin g such a procedure

is beyond the reach of modelers of even developed countries with more
extensive data bases and econometric studies on savings, investment and
fertility behaviour of households.

Indeed modelers most often ignore

distributio nal issues altogether by assuming that the society consists of a
single household or alternative ly avoiding dynamics by concentratin g on static
distributio nal effects.

Given our interest is in dynamics, our strong

assumption has an operational justificatio n that it enables us to derive the
dynamic distributio nal effects in a relatively easy way.

It is also

consistent with econometric studies showing that a log normal distributio n
fits the data from the various rounds of the national sample survey on the
distributio n of households according to per capita private consumption
expenditure .
Public consumption is assumed to be a constant proportion of GDP and it is
spent entirely on non-agricul tural goods.
investment in GDP is exogenously specified.

The proportion of aggregate
Income tax rates adjust so as to

generate enough public savings (revenues minus consumption ) which, together
with household savings and exogenously specified foreign capital inflow, will
equal aggregate investment.

The share of agricultura l investment in aggregate

investment is a function of the relative price of agricultura l goods.
Agricultura l investment influences the total gross cropped area as well as the
irrigated portion of it.

A detailed model of allocation of area among crops,

choice of varieties to be cultivated (high yielding and traditional ),
fertiliser intensity based on a version of Nerlovian adaptive expectation s

-11framework determine the vector of crop outputs.

Capital is the only factor

used in the production of the non-agricultural good.
sector is updated by net investment.

Capital stock in this

Thus, the value of outputs of

agriculture and non-agriculture together net of taxes and transfers determine
the income available to consumers.
The complete algebraic description of the model and its numerical version
are available in Narayana et al (1987a).
available in Narayana et al (1987b).

A more concise description is

It should be pointed out that the two

major weaknesses of the model are the absence of a labour market and the
extreme aggregation of all non-agricultural goods into one.

By the absence of

a labour market we mean first, that labour is not formally treated as a factor
of production in any of the ten sectors that a demand function for labour (let
alone for labour distinguished by age, sex, residence and skill) cannot be
derived from producer behaviour, given the structure of wage rates, product
prices etc. Second, in the household utility function leisure does not enter
nor does the value of labour endowment explicitly enter the household budget
constraint.
behaviour.

Thus a labour supply function cannot be derived from household
With both demand and supply functions absent, deriving an

equilibirum wage rate for each period is ruled out.

There is no capital or

land market in the model in the model so that the only real choices of
agricultural producers are the allocation of available land (irrigated and
unirrigated) to crops (and varieties of crops), and the amount of fertilisers
to use.

Non-agricultural producers can choose the rate of capacity

utilization.

In short, only value added is endogenously derived in the model

and not its allocation between factors.

However this does not preclude an

analysis of distributional effects since the joint distribution of household
income (which is obtained from value added) and consumption is specified
directly. The major reason for not introducing an explicit labour market is
the lack of satisfactory studies of labor supply and demand.

After all, even

in developed countries robust estimates of labour supply elasticities are
scarce!
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One could interpret the absence of an explicit labour market as implying
that an infinitely elastic labour supply at some real wage is being assumed.
But such an interpretation has no operational significance for most of the
analysis except the simulations which involve rural works.

In these scenarios

it is assumed that enough labour will find it attractive to be employed in
rural works programmes offering an exogenously set fixed real wage that is
constant over a twenty year period.

It is impossible to say whether this is

too strong an assumption without a well specified labour market that
realistically describes rural India.

On the other hand, given the actual

rural labour market environment, if indeed not enough labour will be
forthcoming (i.e. there will be an excess demand for labour at the offered
wage), to that extent the scale of rural works programmes could be reduced
without affecting the extent of poverty alleviation.

It is argued that

because of the self-targeting nature of rural works employment, only those
with relatively low reservation wages and capacity for physical work (eg.
women, children and elderly) will be attracted to the programme and to the
extent, physical effort determines the capacity and durability of roads or
irrigation canals constructed with their labour, the quality of such assets
may suffer.

But the complexity of the relationship between food energy intake

and expenditure of energy in work-effort precludes any firm conclusion. There
are no carefully designed empirical studies available to base one's judgment
on this issue.
The assumption that all goods are internationally traded precludes the
analysis of the role of nontraded goods, particularly infrastructural goods in
the development of the Indian economy.

The model is better viewed as

computing a sequence of temporary equilibria rather than a full blown
intertemporal equilibrium.

In particular strong assumptions on preferences

are needed to ensure the intertemporal optimality of the household savings
behaviour incorporated in the model.
aggregate investment in

The specification that the proportion of

GDP is a function only of time also violates the
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spirit of models of intertempor al equilibrium .

Almost all applied general

equilibrium including ours ignore consideratio ns of political economy.

The

assumption that government policy is set exogenously and agents respond to the
policy as if they have no influence in its formulation is extreme.

In fact,

lobbies form and spend resources in getting policies favoured by them enacted
or to appropriate the benefits of policies in place.

These consideratio ns

which form the core of the literature on neo-classic al political economy are
absent from our model.

On the other hand, if the model is broadened to

generate a politico-eco nomic general equilibrium there will be no room for
policy change by definition.

Only a comparative static analysis is possible

with respect to changes in those exogenous variables that determine both
equilibrium policies and economic variables!

4.

The Reference and Policy Scenarios
The role of the reference scenario is to serve as a benchmark for

comparison with scenarios in which one or more policies are changed from their
reference specificatio n.

It should be kept in mind that the model is not a

forecasting model--all the scenarios including the reference scenario are
counterfact ual simulations .

Although, unlike many models of this genre, in

our model values of most of the parameters are econometric ally estimated,
still several were indeed exogenously specified.

It is our contention that

any alternative specificatio n of values of these parameters will change both
the reference and policy scenarios in a similar way so that the impact of
policies expressed as changes relative to the reference scenario would be the
same whichever set of parameter values were used.

In a way, this is more an

article of faith than an analyticall y or empirically established fact.

It is

convenient to have as the reference scenario one in which essentially the
relevant policy regimes remain unchanged in the simulation period as compared
to the pre-simulat ion period.

-14The more important assumptions and policies in the reference scenario are:
(i) The public distribution system for urban areas: the quantity of
foodgrains distributed in any year as a sµare of net output of foodgrains is a
nonlinear function of the level and the change over the previous year of net
output per capita and real non-agricultural income per capita subject to a
ceiling of 135 kgs. per urban resident.

Historically a maximum of little over

150 kgs. per urban resident was distributed in the severe drought year of
1966.

The price subsidy on publicly distributed grain is 20%.

subsidy is 3.0% according to 1989-90 budget.)

(However the

The quantity of foodgrains

purchased below market prices was in general related to output and the ratio
of procurement price relative to expected open market prices.
(ii)

Quantitative restrictions on the net foreign trade of different

agricultural commodities range from 5% to 15% of domestic supply (i.e.
production plus initial stocks).
(iii) Foreign trade deficit is set at 1.5% of GDP.
(iv)

Domestic price policy interventions steer the domestic market prices

gradually towards exogenously specified world prices, i.e. gradual
liberalization of markets is postulated.
(v)

Total population grows by 2.26% per year from its value of 674

million in year 1980 to 1048 million in year 2000.

The proportion of urban

population in the total rises from 23% in 1950 to 31.5% in 2000.
(vi)

Aggregate (public plus private) investment as a proportion of GDP

was assumed to be a monotone function of time with an asymptote of 0.45.
The counterfactual policy scenarios that we consider are:
(i) Variations in the public distribution system ranging from its
abolition to its extension to rural areas and making food rations free (i.e.
100% subsidy).
(ii) A rural works programme targeted at the bottom two classes with
alternative assumptions regarding the efficiency of its design and execution
as well as success in targeting.

-15(iii) Abolition of the fertiliser subsidy and the use of part of the
resources saved for augmenting aggregate investment and the remaining spent
either on a rural works programme or on creating additional irrigated area.
Table 1 provides some recent data on the extent of subsidies relating to
fertilizer and food distribution from the Central government budget.
1988-89 these two amounted to Rs. 56 billion.

In

We should add to this figure

the budgetary support implicit in water charges and electricity tariffs.

Just

charging operating costs (let alone capital charges) would have put at least
40 billion more in the hands of central and state governments.
to government budgets was around Rs. 96 billion in 1988-89.

The total loss

The total

expenditure of the central government in 1988-89 was Rs. 758 billion (revised
estimate) and that of the states was Rs. 542 billion (budget estiamte),

The

above four subsidies account roughly for 12.5% of central budget and 7.5% of
the budget of the centre and states together.

5.

Simulation Results
The welfare impact of alternative policies can be seen by comparing the

distribution of population according to their equivalent expenditures

(i.e.

consumption expenditure needed to achieve the welfare achieved under the
policy if consumers were to face 1970 prices).

Since the average equivalent

expenditure within each class as well as the proportion of population in the
class can vary among policy scenarios, for an overall comparison we adapt the
approach of Willig and Bailey (1981).

They show that, given a population of

individuals ranked from 1 ton according to their equivalent expenditures,
1
2
m ~i and m ~i' in two distributions (i.e., mj~i

the expenditure that a

person i needs at some base price pO to achieve the same welfare that he
enjoys at prices pj and nominal income yj in distribution j, j

1.2), the

first distribution is preferred to the second according to any social welfare
function that satisfies the Pareto principle, anonymity, and aversion to
regressive transfer if and only if
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k
~

i

1

1

m.].

k

>

~

i

2

1

m.].

for

k

1,2, ... ,n.

It should be noted that person i (i.e., the one having the ith lowest
equivalent expenditure) in distribution 1 need not be the same as person i in
distribution 2.

As the authors point out, the above inequality fork= 1

corresponds to a Rawlsian social welfare fnction, and fork= n corresponds to
the Hicksian compensation criterion.

But for a general social welfare

function, the inequality has to hold for all k to ensure dominance.

Of

course, the ranking is not independent of the base price vector pO, and this
serious limitation has to be kept in mind in interpreting the results.
Another welfare indicator that we use is the average energy intakes (kcals
per capita per day).

5.A.

Alternative Public Distribution Policies
Three public distribution scenarios are compared wiLh Lhe reference

scenario.

In scenario DPO, at one extreme, the distribution system including

domestic procurement is abolished.

FRFD-lOOW, at the other extreme, provides

100 kg of wheat per year to all consumers, urban as well as rural, with the
cost being financed by increasing income taxes (largely borne by the two
richest classes of urban consumers).

Policy FRFD-lOOW-X is the same as

FRFD-100-W except that the subsidy is financed by reducing investment.
results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.

The

All policy changes relative to the

reference scenario are introduced in 1980.
The implications of the simulations presented in Tables 2 and 3 are clear.
The aggregate impact of alternative public distribution in terms of GDP
growth, average energy intake per capita per day etc are modest.

For example,

between the extremes DPO and FRFD-lOOW, real GDP in year 2000 differs only by
about 10%.

On the other hand, the distributional consequences differ
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substantially between policies.

The massive redistribution scenario FRFD-l00W

of supplying 100 kgs. of wheat free of cost to all, financed by additional
taxation results in a substantial reduction by 60% in the poorest population
in rural areas from the reference value of 164 million (31.6% of rural
population) in 1980.

The reduction is by 39% from 148 million (20.5% of rural

population) in 2000.

The reduction in the number of urban poorest is

numerically considerably smaller since there are fewer urban poorest but
proportionately more impressive than the rural reduction.

The other extreme,

DPO which abolishes the public distribution system that operates in urban
areas only in the reference run, has negligible impact on the rural poorest
but, as expected, increases the population in the poorest class in urban areas
significantly.

The growth consequences of financing a free food policy by

reductions in investment are marginal (i.e. less than 10% fall in real GDP
over a 20-year period).

However poverty reduction is virtually the same as

compared to financing by additional taxation.

In any case, a social welfare

measure based on equivalent incomes that incorporates aversion to regressive
income transfers shows that a free food policy improves social welfare in a
modest way (see Figure 1).

In an apparent paradox the abolition of the public

distribution system reduces real GDP growth slightly.

The paradox is only

apparent--it is a consequence of the fact that in the reference scenario the
public distribution system generates more revenue through procurement tax than
it spends on consumption subsidies in later years.

This is because the model

does not restrict procurement to equal what is distributed.
It should be pointed out that in all the food subsidy scenarios the
recipient of the food ration is assumed to be able to sell a part or the whole
of the ration as he sees fit at open market prices.

Thus the subsidy on the

food ration is equivalent to an income subsidy of equivalent value at open
market prices. We also examined the consequences of the polar opposite
assumption of the impossibility of open market sale.

This meant that as long

-18as the ration is not free the very poor cannot afford to buy and consume their
entire ration.

They buy only what they can afford and the impact on their

welfare of the ration is less than in the case where rations can be freely
sold.
The above analysis assumes that the extension of the public distribution
system to rural areas does not involve any additional costs, i.e. the unit
cost of the distribution system does not depend either on its scale in terms
of the volume of grains procured and distributed nor on its geographical
coverage.

If there are economies (diseconomies) of scale or scope the unit

cost will fall (rise) as the system is extended.
evidence it is hard to decide on this issue.

Without any robust empirical

In any case our results are

based on assuming that unit costs do not change.

While it is true that our

model postulates a fairly high incremental capital output ratio (IGOR), it is
kept the same in policy and reference scenarios.

As such the growth

consequence of alternative policies expressed as a percentage change from the
reference scenarios are not affected by the high IGOR.

5.B.

Rural Work Programmes
A more complete discussion of the rationale for Rural Works Programmes

(RWP) and detailed simulation results are presented in Narayana et al (1988).
We assume that only the two poorest expenditure classes are the target groups
to be covered under RWP.

An average quantity of 100 kgs of foodgrains per

year are distributed to the participants as wages.

However, the per capita

quantity distributed to the poorer of the two classes is fixed at 125 kg so
that the quantity r2 received by the next poorest class is given by
r2 = (lOOp - 125p1)/p2

where p, Pl, P2 are respectively the population of

the two classes together, of class 1 and of class 2.

The value of r2 varies

between scenarios because of variation in p, Pl and P2·
Various inefficiencies and leakages do occur in RWP.

Analytically these
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The first one relates to the productivity of

the assets created under RWP relative to that of non RWP investment in the
economy.

The second one relates to a failure of targeting--the benefits

intended for the target groups leaking to non-target groups.
In our model the inefficiencies of the first kind are introduced through
an efficiency ~arameter e (which takes three values 1.0, 0.5 and 0.0)
representing the ratio of the productivity of RWP created assets relative to
economy-wide average return to investment.

Clearly e = 1 represents a

well-designed and executed RWP, while e = 0 represents an RWP with which is
completely infructuous as investment but is simply a transfer.

Targeting

efficiency is represented by a parameter t (taking two values 1.0 and 0.5)
representing the proportion of RWP wage bill that accrues to the target groups
in rural areas.

We present the simulation results in Table 4.

A scenario is

characterized by its (t,e) combination and the mode of financing of its cost,
namely, whether it is through additional taxation or by reduction in
investment.

Thus a free foo<l sc.en~rio in which 40 kg of wheat is distributed

free to all is also considered and financed by reduction in investment.
costs roughly the same as the RWP.

This

This scenario is denoted as FF40X.

It is seen from Table 4 that in a well designed, executed and targeted
RWP, not only the rural poor improve their welfare substantially but the
economy grows slightly faster (because of the additional investment through
rural works) as well, provided the resources needed for the RWP are raised
through additional taxation.

However the additional tax effort needed

initially is substantial--in 1980 an additional 6% of GDP has to be raised as
income taxes over the reference run value of 2% but with the economy growing,
additional tax effort required declines substantially and by the year 2000
reduces to around 1% of GDP with the reference run value being 7%.

As such,

if foreign aid in the form of grants are available for a limited period,
poverty alleviation through RWP can be initiated without straining the fiscal
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If foreign aid is not available and taxes cannot

be raised, an RWP financed through a reduction in investment reduced real GDP
in year 2000 by a marginal 4.6% relative to the reference run while it was
higher by 3.5% in the scenario with tax financed RWP.

Thus the sacrifice in

growth is modest, while the favourable impact on the welfare of the poor is
unchanged.

Further social welfare comparison using the Bailey-Willig

criterion shows (Figure 2) that such an RWP dominates a free food policy that
costs just as much.

Finally, if the investment component of RWP is completely

infructuous, and 50% leakage occurs, the welfare of the poor is roughly halved
compared to a well designed, executed and targeted RWP also financed by
taxation.

5.C

The Abolition of the Fertiliser Subsidy
It was pointed out earlier that farmers receive a subsidy of roughly 30%

on the price of the fertilisers they use.

We examine below the consequences

of abolishing the subsidy from 1989 onwards and use the resources used for
financing the subsidy in three alternative ways; (i) augment aggregate
investment (scenario NS), (ii) use part of the released resources for
financing a RWP that distributes 20 kg of wheat per capita per .year as wages
to the two poorest rural classes, with t and e parameters both set at 0.5.
The remaining part of the released resources is used for augmenting aggregate
investment.

This scenario is denoted as NS-RW20, (iii) use part of the

released resources to create an additional 2 million hectares of irrigated
area per year over the reference run.

The remaining part is used to augment

aggregate investment. This scenario is denoted by NS-IR+ 2M.

The simulation

results of this section are based on a slightly updated version of the model
of the earlier sections in which some parameters have been reestimated with
data up to 1984.

As such the reference scenario results for these simulations

differ from those for the simulations of sections 4A and 4B although the
policies remain the same.

Further policy changes are introduced in 1989.The

results are presented in Table 5.
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fertilisers (as in the reference scenario) increases real GDP by a negligible
1% and reduces the output of foodgrains by about 4% in year 2000.

The

proportion of the rural population in the poorest class increases by 4% in
1990 as well as 2000.

The urban pooor are unaffected. Using part of the

resources saved from the abolition of the fertiliser subsidy on rural works
and the rest on additional.investment improves the real income of the poorest
in rural areas while leaving GDP, foodgrains output and urban popr unchanged
as compared to investing all of it.

On the other hand, creating additional

irrigated area of 2 million hectares per year with part of the resources and
using the rest for increasing investment increases real GDP by 9%, fertiliser
use by 5% and foodgrains output by 12% all in year 2000 compared to the
reference scenario in the continuing fertiliser subsidy.

The proportion of

the rural population in the poorest rural class falls by about 1.5%.

What

this suggests is that augmenting irrigated area, rather than subsidizing the
use of fertiliser, achieves not only increased use of fertiliser but has
beneficial impact on the rural poor. Compared to the scenario in which there
is no fertiliser subsidy, the changes in poverty or in macro aggregates
associated with the other three scenarios in Table 5 are very small.

In other

words untargeted and indirect poverty alleviation policies cannot be expected
to make much of a dent on poverty.

6.

Conclusions
We considered three broad sets of policies for alleviating rural poverty

and hunger, namely, an untargeted policy of subsidizing part of the food
consumption of the entire population including the poor, a targeted policy of
providing additional employment opportunities for the rural poor through a
rural works programme (RWP) and an indirect policy of subsidizing fertilizer
or alternatively increasing the area irrigated both of which augment the
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production of food.

It would appear that a well designed, executed and

targeted RWP has the greatest impact on the poor.

Thus, compared to a free

food programme that provides 40 kgs of grain to all that raises the energy
intake of the poorest (two poorest) class in rural areas by 11% (10%), an RWP
of comparable cost raises it by 70% (40%) over its reference run value.

The

increase in equivalent income is 11% (10%) in the case of free food and 67%
(39%) in the case of RWP.
FF40X in Table 3.

This is seen by comparing scenario RWl00-1-1 and

The indirect poverty allevition policies of subsidizing

fertilisers or augmenting irrigation as expected have only modest impacts.
would appear that the potential of employment generation in poverty
alleviation has been understood by policy makers.

The introduction recently

of the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, an employment programme that consolidates and
expands preexisting programmes, is an indicator of this fact.

It
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Table 1

Food and Fertilizer Subsidies in
Central Government Budget
(Rupees billion)

Year

Fertilizer

Food

1979-80

6.03

6.00

1980-81

5.05

6.50

1981-82

3.75

7.00

1982-82

6.05

7.10

1983-84

10.42

8.35

1984-85

19.27

11.00

1985-86

19.24

16.50

1986-87

19.33

22.00

1987-88

19.16

22.00

1988-89a

32.50

23.60

1989-90Q

36.51

22.00

aRevised budget estimate.
bBudget estimate.
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Table 2
Impact of Alternative Procurement and Distribution Systems
on Selected Macro Economic Indicators
Absolute
Values
Variable

GDP totala
GDP agriculturea
GDP non-agriculturea
Total investmenta
Tax rate(%)
Price index of
agriculture over
price index of
non-agriculture

Year

Reference
scenario

1980
2000

530.0
1429.0

1980
2000

220.0
354.0

1980
2000

310.0
1075.0

1980
2000

492.0

110.0

Percent Change over
Reference scenario
FRFD-l00W FRFD-l00W-X
DPO
Free food
Free food
no pro
to all;
curement
to all;
Tax rate
Tax rate
no dis
fixed
tribution adjusted
0

-0.07

0

0. 72

0
0

0

0

0

-0.09
0
0

1980

2.3

39.0

2000

9.8

11.2

1980
2000

0.93
0.89

-0.15
0.46

0.47

0

-9.36
0

-2.50
0

0.81

-11. 62

0

-16. 71
-18.46

1.19
486.9
19.39

160.87C

12.5
2.89

18.44
4.30

0

1980
2000

786.0
1363 .0

-0.07

0.72

-9.36

Food energy
intake
(Kcal/person/day)

1980
2000

2162
2569.0

0.42
0.45

3.63
1.59

5.42
-1.18

Average equivalent
Expenditurec

1980
2000

544.0
661.0

-0.18

-0.44
0.46

3.43
-2.82

GDP per capitab

0

0

0

a109 Rupees at 1970 prices.
bRupees at 1970 prices.
CExpenditure needed at 1970 prices to provide same utility as
provided by current consumption at current prices.

0
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Table 3
Impact on the Poorest Class of Alternative Public
Distribution Policies
Poorest Class with Annual Per Capita
Equivalent Expenditure of less
than Rs.216
Itemsa

Absolute
Values

Percentage Change Over
Reference Scenario
FRFD-lOOW

FRFX-lOOW

REF

DPO

Rural 1980
Population
Equivalent Expenditure
Energy Intake

0.316
129.0
981.0

0.00
1. 32
1. 33

-60.32
15.49
14.78

-60.44
14.18
13.15

Urban
Population
Equivalent Expenditure
Energy Intake

0.019
165.0
1085.0

52.63
-1.03
-1.11

-89.47
-7.95
-9. 77

-89.47
-9.65
-11. 80

Rural 2000
Population
Equivalent Expenditure
Energy Intake

0.205
133.0
1059.0

1.46
2.64
2.08

-38.54
15.51
15.20

-34.15
15.59
13. 22

Urban 2000
Population
Equivalent Expenditure
Energy Intake

0.004
172.0
1252.0

75.00
-1. 51
-2.64

-50.00
-0.29
-1.92

-25.00
-0.87
-4.95

aunits:

Population - proportion of total rural or urban population.
Equivalent - Rupees per cpaita with 1970-71 prices as reference
prices.
Expenditure
Energy
Intake

- Kcal per person per day (as reflected in the data of
household's expenditure--excludes consumption provided
by employer at place of work).
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Table 4
Impact on Growth and Rural Poor of Rural Works Programs

Percent Change from Reference run - Year 2000
Rural Poor
Scenarios

GDP70
per
capita

Difference
in GDP 70
growth rate
1980-2000

Poorest
Class
Avr
EQY/
Ca:g

Two
Poorest
Classes

Cal/
Ca:g

EQY/
Ca:g

ENY/
Ca:g

EQY/
Ca:g

With additional
Taxation:
3.5

0.22

2.2

5.7

67

70

39

RWl00-1-lX

-4.6

-0.25

-0.2

4.7

67

70

39

RW100-1-.5X

-8.5

-0.47

-2.6

3.8

67

70

39

RWl00-1-0X

-13. 2

-0.73

-5.4

2.6

67

70

39

RWl00-.5-lX

-3.7

-0.20

0

3.0

33

40

19

RWl00- .5- .5X

-7.3

-0.40

-2.0

2.1

33

40

19

RWl00-. 5-0X

-11. 8

-0.66

-4.7

1.0

33

40

19

-4.2

-0.23

-0.8

1. 3

11

11

10

RWl00-1-1
With fixed
tax rates:

FF40X
GDP70

Gross domestic product at 1970-71 prices.

EQY

Equivalent Expenditure;

ENY: Energy Intake (kcals per day)
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Impact of Alternative Input Subsidy Schemes
Reference
Scenario
(fert. sub
sidy (30%)
continued)

NS-RW20
NS
(rural
(No fert.
works)
subsidy
from
1989

NS-IR+2M
(additional
irrigation)

GDP 70 (10**9 1970 Rs)

1990
2000

746.01
1262.93

746.23
1280.43

746.23
1276.09

748.32
1371. 80

GDP Agr* 70 (10**9
1970 Rs)

1990
2000

247.47
315.55

247.69
317.13

247.69
317.09

249.78
346.65

Fertilizer use (10**3N)

1990
2000

10007
12874

8625
11160

Total irrigated area
(10**6 hectares)

8625
11154

8846
13552

1990
2000

56.19
77.85

56.19
79.24

56.19
79.19

58.17
103.48

Wheat (10**6 tonnes)

1990
2000

57.82
82.18

52.78
76.67

52.78
76.64

53.97
92.12

Rice (10**6 tonnes)

1990
2000

64.37
85.84

63.67
85.74

63.67
85.69

65.26
103.93

Foodgrains (10**6 tonnes)

1990
2000

161. 03
209.47

154.45
201.76

154.45
201.70

157.64
234.48

1990
2000

2129
2307

2101
2292

515.7
580.3

578.0

TOTAL POPULATION
Energy intake
(Kcal/person /day)

1990
Average equivalent
2000
ay)
(Rs/person/d
Expenditure

509.4

2122
2305
512.9
579.5

2104
2347
510.2
t:('1

(\

uv.1... v

RURAL POOREST CLASS
Proportion of rural
population

1990
2000

Equivalent Expenditure

1990
2000

0.389
0.307
120.2
124.7

0.404
0.320
118.8
123.5

0.404
0.320
124.4
128.8

0.403
0.303
118.9
124.7

URBAN POOREST CLASS
Proportion of urban
population

1990
2000

Equivalent Expenditure
(Rs./person /day)

1990
2000

0.020
0.010
172. 7
172.5

0.020
0.009
172.7
172.6

0.020
0.009
172.7
172.5

0.020
0.009
172. 7
173.3
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